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Over the past 20 years, the Japanese national saving 
rate has on average exceeded the U.S. national saving 
rate. This principally reflects the very high level of the 
Japanese rate in the late 1960s and the early 1970s. 
Since then the Japanese and U.S. saving rates have been 
converging, as the Japanese rate has fallen toward the 
U.S. level. Recently, though, the Japanese saving rate 
seems to have risen. So, where is that rate going next? 
One possibility is that the recent increase is permanent 
and may even signal a return to the very high saving 
rates observed earlier. Of course, another possibility is 
that the rate will go down: maybe its recent rise is 
simply a temporary aberration from the general trend of 
convergence between the U.S. and Japanese saving 
rates. 
Which answer is generally believed has important 
implications for U.S. trade policy. A widespread belief 
that the recent Japanese saving rate increase is perma-
nent would encourage those who are pressuring the U.S. 
Congress to enact protectionist trade legislation. Their 
idea is that the Japanese people—perhaps out of com-
pulsive frugality—are chronically driven to save more 
than their own country can absorb in the form of 
investment. This excess of saving over investment is, by 
an accounting identity, the Japanese trade surplus and 
is held responsible for a variety of ills in the United 
States. If, however, the recent rise in the Japanese 
saving rate is generally believed to be only temporary, 
just a blip in an otherwise downward trend, protectionist 
legislation would have less support. This is because— 
barring a slump in domestic Japanese investment—a 
fall in the Japanese saving rate would automatically 
shrink the Japanese trade surplus. 
The purpose of this paper is to evaluate this second 
possibility. I find that although there is not enough 
evidence to reach a definite conclusion, it is clear that 
this possibility cannot be dismissed. In light of this, 
Congress should be cautious about enacting potentially 
harmful protectionist trade legislation based on predic-
tions that the current level of the Japanese saving rate is 
permanent. 
The possibility that the Japanese saving rate is 
trending down toward the U.S rate was articulated by 
Hayashi (1986) at the end of his very detailed investi-
gation of the differences between the Japanese and U.S. 
national saving rates.
1 Hayashi's idea, which I call the 
reconstruction hypothesis; is that the high saving rate in 
the late 1960s and the early 1970s can be accounted 
for by the neoclassical model of economic growth as 
Japan's efforts to reconstruct its capital stock that was 
severely damaged in World War II. He suggests that the 
*Also Research Affiliate, National Bureau of Economic Research. The 
author has benefited greatly from numerous conversations with S. Rao Aiyagari 
and V. V. Chari. He is also grateful to Fumio Hayashi for his comments and for 
providing the Japanese data used in this study. 
1 An important finding of Hayashi (in his 1986 paper and in his paper in this 
issue of the Quarterly Review) is that official measures of the Japanese and U.S. 
saving rates are not comparable because they are based on different accounting 
concepts. The facts about the Japanese and U.S. saving rates that I describe 
above are based on data adjusted by Hayashi to assure comparability. 
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reconstruction efforts were not completed until the 
early 1980s, and he expects the Japanese and U.S. sav-
ing rates to be about the same, on average, from now on. 
The neoclassical growth model Hayashi (1986) 
appeals to is the one pioneered by Solow (1956). 
Stimulated by the work of Kydland and Prescott (1982) 
and Prescott (1986), macroeconomists have developed 
formal versions of this model that they now routinely 
use to assess the ability of various factors to quantitative-
ly account for macroeconomic phenomena of interest.
2 
The reconstruction hypothesis falls naturally into this 
framework. Accordingly, here I take a simplified ver-
sion of the standard neoclassical model that is in 
widespread use among macroeconomists and see 
whether wartime destruction of physical capital in the 
model results in a saving rate path similar to the path 
taken by the actual Japanese postwar saving rate. I find 
that the two paths differ substantially. I conclude that, 
according to this model, it is implausible to think that 
the seeds of Japan's high saving rate in the 1960s and 
1970s lie in the wartime destruction of its physical 
capital, as the reconstruction hypothesis posits. 
This finding is unfortunate for the reconstruction 
hypothesis. However, it is not necessarily devastating. 
The hypothesis may still be a good one, for the negative 
result just described may simply reflect the failure of 
the standard model to capture some important features 
of an economy hit by a very large shock. Below, I 
discuss a couple of such features and show how modify-
ing the standard model to incorporate one of them 
enables it to account reasonably well for the Japanese 
saving experience. 
This alone does not vindicate the reconstruction 
hypothesis, though, since the modification was de-
signed with the specific objective of accounting for the 
observed pattern of the Japanese saving rate. To be 
credible, the hypothesis needs some independent sup-
porting evidence on the plausibility of the model 
modification. The good performance of my modified 
model instead accomplishes two things. First, it estab-
lishes that there exists (at least) one simple version of 
the neoclassical model with the potential to rationalize 
the reconstruction hypothesis. Second, the analysis 
suggests what sort of empirical evidence would be 
useful to establish credibility of the reconstruction 
hypothesis. I leave for future research the task of seeing 
whether that evidence actually exists. 
A problem that any study working with the neoclassi-
cal growth model encounters is the relatively technical 
one of having to find its solution. To keep the presenta-
tion of my results as simple as possible, I have put the 
details of the solution method I use in an Appendix to 
this paper. Besides facilitating the reproducibility of my 
results, I hope the Appendix is useful as a completely 
worked case study of how to solve a neoclassical 
growth model. 
A Sketch of the Hypothesis and the Evidence 
Before plunging into the formal analysis, I sketch the 
neoclassical view on which the reconstruction hypothe-
sis is based and describe some informal empirical 
evidence that suggests the hypothesis merits serious 
attention. I then indicate somewhat more precisely 
what it is that makes it hard for the standard model to 
rationalize the reconstruction hypothesis in the Japa-
nese context. 
According to the neoclassical analysis, a reduction in 
physical capital—due, say, to wartime destruction— 
raises the return on investment in capital. This sparks a 
period of reconstruction during which output and cap-
ital per capita grow unusually rapidly, stimulated by 
high saving and investment. Eventually, the levels of 
per capita output and capital converge to the growth 
path they would have been on had the initial capital 
reduction not occurred. Put differently, the per capita 
output paths of all countries with similar economies 
eventually coincide, regardless of their starting position. 
At a broad, qualitative level, some empirical evi-
dence supports this analysis. Barro( 1987, chap. 1 l),for 
example, studies data from nine industrialized countries 
and finds that the countries starting in the 1950s with 
the lowest per capita output (and, presumably, capital) 
also had the highest output growth and investment rate. 
He finds that, over time, output growth fell in the 
initially low-income countries while it was relatively 
stable in the initially high-income countries (like the 
United States). As a result, all nine countries' per capita 
output levels appear to be converging, which is consis-
tent with the neoclassical analysis. 
Focusing on the case of Japan, Hayashi (1986) also 
points to evidence that seems qualitatively consistent 
2For example, Kydland and Prescott (1982) and Prescott (1986) investi-
gate the ability of technology shocks to account for the magnitude of U.S. 
output fluctuations, while Hansen (1985) investigates the ability of labor 
indivisibilities to account for the relative volatility of U.S. hours worked and 
productivity. The near zero correlation between U.S. hours worked and produc-
tivity has also attracted attention. Eichenbaum and I investigate the potential 
for government spending shocks to account for this (Christiano and Eichen-
baum 1988b) as well as the possible role of learning-by-doing human capital 
accumulation (Christiano and Eichenbaum 1988a). Braun (1988) considers the 
impact of stochastic, distortionary taxes. Hodrick, Kocherlakota, and Lucas 
(1988) investigate the ability of cash-in-advance constraints to account for the 
observed volatility of money velocity. In Christiano 1988, I investigate the 
potential for inventories' buffer stock role to account for their volatility. 
11 with the neoclassical analysis. He points out that 
Japan's saving rate has been high, but generally falling 
for the last 15 years. He also notes that the per capita 
Japanese and U.S. gross national products (GNPs) have 
recently been very close. For example, in 1987 per 
capita U.S. GNP was $18,559 while the corresponding 
figure for Japan (converted from yen to dollars) was 
$19,542.
3 
Comparisons of per capita output may be misleading 
because of possible violations of purchasing power 
parity. We can avoid the use of exchange rates by 
comparing the two countries' capital-to-output ratios, 
as measured by the ratio of wealth to net national 
product (NNP). Because of its assumption of a dimin-
ishing marginal product of capital, the neoclassical 
analysis predicts that destruction of part of the capital 
stock causes a fall in the capital-to-output ratio, 
followed by an eventual rise in this ratio to where it 
would have been had the capital stock not initially been 
damaged. Hayashi (in his paper in this issue of the 
Quarterly Review) points to evidence which suggests 
that the Japanese capital-to-output ratio has been rising 
in the past 15 years and that it is now very close to the 
U.S. ratio, which itself has been roughly trendless. 
Discussion of the capital-to-output ratio is subject to 
one very important caveat. This is because the behavior 
of the Japanese capital-to-output ratio before the 
period emphasized by Hayashi poses a potentially very 
severe problem for the reconstruction hypothesis. In 
particular, as Hayashi (in this issue) shows, that ratio 
was high and falling in the mid- to late 1950s. If these 
data are to be believed, this means that the war's impact 
on the Japanese stock of physical capital was elimi-
nated by the mid-1950s and that subsequent events-
such as the high saving rate of the late 1960s and the 
early 1970s—could not have anything to do with the 
postwar reconstruction of physical capital. Hayashi (in 
this issue) emphasizes that a good case can be made 
that these early capital-to-output data can be dismissed 
because they reflect measurement error in capital. In 
the rest of this paper, I assume that this is so. More 
careful measurement of these ratios to check the valid-
ity of this assumption would be desirable. 
While there is some evidence that is qualitatively 
consistent with Hayashi's hypothesis, I wonder whether 
postwar economic developments in Japan are quantita-
tively consistent with it. For example, according to the 
reconstruction hypothesis, Japan recovered from the 
wartime destruction only recently—almost 40 years 
later. Is the neoclassical analysis consistent with such a 
long adjustment period? Hayashi (in this issue) docu-
ments that the Japanese saving rate was increasing in 
the 1950s and the early 1960s before falling in the 
1970s. Is this hump-shaped pattern and the timing of 
the top of the hump (the peak) consistent with the 
neoclassical analysis? 
In the context of a standard version of the neoclas-
sical growth model, the answer to both questions is no. 
I reached this conclusion by simulating the model's 
response to a drastic drop in the capital stock, such as 
the one Japan suffered in the war. In this model, 95 per-
cent of the effects of the war are dissipated in 26 years, 
far fewer than the nearly 40 years Hayashi's hypothesis 
requires. In addition, the model implies that the saving 
and growth rates peak immediately after the war, so 
that it cannot account for the hump-shaped pattern 
actually observed in these variables. 
The Standard Neoclassical Model 
Now I describe the standard version of the neoclassical 
growth model that I use in my analysis. 
The Economy 
In the standard model, economywide consumption, 
saving, and investment are assumed to behave as if 
chosen by a fictitious representative agent who seeks to 
maximize the present value of the utility of consump-
tion subject to a resource constraint. The actions of the 
representative agent are assumed to mimic the equilib-
rium outcomes in an economy with many households 
interacting anonymously in competitive markets.
4 The 
time unit in the model is one year. The representative 
agent's resource constraint is 
(1) Ct + Kt+{ -(l-8)Kt= Yt 
where Ct, Kt, and Yt are economywide, period t consump-
tion; beginning-of-period t capital; and period t gross 
output, respectively. The parameter 8 is the annual rate 
of depreciation on a unit of capital. Gross output, Yt, is 
assumed to be related to the factors of production by 
this production function: 




where zt summarizes the existing state of technological 
3This is based on a 1987 per capita GNP in Japan of 2.83 million yen. 
I converted yen to dollars using the 1987 exchange rate of 144.6 yen per dollar. 
The Japanese data are from Japan 1989a (p. 52). The U.S. data are from U.S. 
President 1989 (nominal GNP, p. 308; total population, p. 343; the exchange 
rate, p. 431). 
4These ideas are completely standard. For a review of them in the present 
context, see Christiano 1987. 
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knowledge, Nt denotes the working age population, 
and 6 is a parameter of the production function, with 
0 < 6 < 1. Both zt and Nt are assumed to grow exoge-
nously at the fixed rates x and n} respectively: 
(3) z, =expCx)z,_! 
(4) Nt = exp(n)Nt-{. 
Implicit in (2) is the assumption that the labor force 
participation rate is constant and normalized to 1. 
The representative agent's preferences over con-





where p is the discount rate. Thus, the representative 
agent seeks to maximize (5) subject to (l)-(4) and a 
given value of ^945. (Here, t = 1946 denotes the year 
1946.) 
Parameters and Steady States 
In parameterizing the model, I use estimates from 
postwar U.S. data. I do this for two reasons. One is that it 
makes sense. This is because the neoclassical explana-
tion for Japan's saving rate exceeding the U.S. rate 
abstracts from all differences between the two coun-
tries, apart from their initial capital stocks. Thus, a 
maintained hypothesis of the neoclassical analysis is 
that, to a first approximation, the results will be 
insensitive to the choice of data set used to assign values 
to the parameters. This is a subject worth further 
investigation. The other reason I use U.S. data is that it 
simplifies things. Other studies (Christiano 1988 and 
Christiano and Eichenbaum 1988b) provide a detailed 
discussion of how U.S. data were constructed and used 
to estimate the parameters of the model. By using those 
parameter estimates, I can simply refer readers to those 
studies for details, thus conserving space here. These 
two studies set p = 0.03 a priori. They show that U.S. 
data imply the following estimates for the other param-
eters: 0 = 0.36, 8 = 0.07, jc = 0.016, and n = 0.013. 
The model has the property that Yt, Ct> and Kt all 
eventually grow at the rate x + n. When this happens, 
the variables are said to have converged to a steady-state 
growth path. In particular, yt, ct, and kt, where lower-
case letters signify division by ztNt, converge to con-
stants. Denote these by y, c, and k, respectively. Then it 
is easy to verify that, at the assigned parameter values, 
(6) y = k?= 1.77 
(7) c = k? + [l-8-cxp(x+n)]k = 1.28 




 = 4.89. 
The consumption-to-gross output ratio implied by these 
numbers is 0.72. In Christiano 1988,1 report that this is 
also the average value of the consumption-to-output 
ratio in quarterly U.S. data over the period from 1956 
to 1984. The capital-to-gross output ratio implied by 
(6)-(8) is 2.76, which is similar to the average value of 
2.65 observed in the U.S. data.
5 Regardless of the initial 
value of Kt, eventually (in the steady state) the variables 
converge to the following path: 
(9) Yt = ztNty 
(10) Kt = ztNtk 
(11) Ct = ztNtc. 
This is the convergence result associated with the neo-
classical analysis that was mentioned above. 
I define the net saving rate, st, as follows: 
(12) st=(Kt^-Kt)/(Y~8Kt) 
= [expOt+*)(*,+1/*,) -1 v(yA-8). 
This is the ratio of net capital accumulation to net 
output. The expression after the second equality sign in 
(12) is obtained by dividing the numerator and denomi-
nator of the expression after the first equality sign by 
ztNt. In the steady state: 
(13) 5 = [exp(*+n) ~ l]/^"
1 - S) = 0.10. 
In Christiano 1988,1 do not report an estimate of the 
average U.S. net saving rate. However, the results of 
Hayashi (in this issue) indicate that the 10 percent 
figure in (13) is close to the U.S. postwar average. 
Finally, the net rate of return on a period t investment 
in a unit of capital is obtained by differentiating Yt+{ 
5In Christiano 1988,1 measure consumption as government consumption 
plus purchases of goods and services plus the service flow from the stock of 
consumer durables. Output is GNP plus the service flow from the stock of con-
sumer durables. My measure of the capital stock includes the stock of consumer 
durables and government capital, in addition to producer structures and 
equipment and private residential capital. Since my measure of capital includes 
government capital, it would be desirable to include in my measure of output 
the service flow from government capital. I omit this because, to my knowledge, 
there is no existing measure of it. Hayashi's measure of the U.S. wealth-to-
output ratio (in this issue) is less than mine, presumably because his measure of 
wealth excludes government capital and the stock of household durables. 




 — 8.1 denote the product of this and 
100 by Rt. After taking into account that kt = Kt/(ztNt): 
(14) Rt= 100(0*?+/-<5). 
In the steady state, R = 6.04 percent. This is close to the 
average return on U.S. capital over the postwar period. 
For example, in Christiano 1989b, I report an average 
real return of 6.43 percent on Standard and Poor's 
500-stock price index and of 5.26 percent on the 
economywide stock of capital. 
The Destruction of Capital 
To derive the standard model's implications for the 
partial destruction of Japan's capital stock, I obviously 
need an estimate of how much below the steady state 
that capital Kt was in 1946. Simple interpolation ap-
plied to the data in Romer (1986, p. 229, Fig. 1) 
suggests that Japanese output in 1946 was about 47 
percent below its prewar trend, which I assume was a 
steady-state growth path. I assign all responsibility for 
this reduction to a fall in Kl946 in the production 
function; then, given 6 = 0.36, this implies that AT1946 
was only 12 percent of its steady-state value. This 
overestimates the amount by which Japanese capital 
was below the steady state to the extent that part of the 
responsibility for the below-trend level of output in 
1946 reflects a reduction in zt or Nt. 
For the given value of ^945,1 compute sequences, 
{Ct,Kt+l,Yt,st;t= 1946, 1947,. . . , 1999}, that max-
imize (5) subject to (l)-(4). From the Yt series I also 
compute Yt, the growth rate of gross output: 
(15) % = {Y1+-Y,)IY, 
Details of how I do these calculations are in the 
Appendix. 
The Standard Model Fails ... 
Now let's look at what the standard neoclassical model 
has to say about the effects of the destruction of capital. 
We'll do that by looking at a series of charts that display 
the model's simulated data and the actual data for 
various variables. 
Turn first to Chart 1. The simulated graph of the 
saving rate, st, is the line marked standard model Note 
that the saving rate for this model peaks immediately at 
around 46 percent of NNP and then falls monotoni-
cally. By 1972,26 years after 1946, the model has very 
nearly converged to its steady-state growth path. By 
that year, for example, 95 percent of the 1946 discrep-
ancy between actual and steady-state capital has been 
eliminated. Note how different the actual data are. They 
are hump-shaped and peak in 1970, at roughly the 
same time that the standard model has converged. (The 
actual data are from Hayashi's Chart 2 in this issue.) 
Chart 2 graphs the growth in GNP, The standard 
model's pattern of % very much resembles that of st: % 
peaks immediately and then declines monotonically. 
This pattern also differs sharply from the actual data, 
which more or less display a hump shape. 
The capital-to-output ratio is plotted in Chart 3. 
Note how quickly the standard model's ratio rises. 
Essentially, it has already converged to its steady-state 
value by the early 1970s, just when the corresponding 
actual values are rising most steeply. Note the U shape 
of the data: the capital-to-output ratio starts out rela-
tively high in the mid-1950s, then falls, levels off, and 
rises. As noted above, the downward-sloping part of the 
U here is incompatible with the reconstruction hypoth-
esis, in the context of the class of neoclassical growth 
models considered here. Thus, taking the reconstruction 
hypothesis seriously depends heavily on the validity of 
Hayashi's conjecture that the Japanese capital-to-
output ratio in the 1950s is mismeasured. (The actual 
data here are from Hayashi's Chart 4 in this issue.) 
The standard model's implied time path for the 
return on capital, Rt, is plotted in Chart 4. This return is 
predicted to be very high—31 percent—in 1946, but 
then it declines rapidly to its steady-state value of 6.04 
percent. The erratic curve in Chart 4 is the inflation-
adjusted return in the Japanese stock market, which I 
use as a crude indicator of the return to capital.
6 The 
variance in that data series seems so large that it is very 
hard to say with confidence whether or not the Rt
9s 
implied by the standard model are consistent with the 
evidence. The model's /?,'s do, though, look a bit lower 
than the actual data. 
The path of log(^) is reported in Chart 5 to help give 
perspective on the results. The straight line is the 
steady-state output path that would by hypothesis have 
occurred had there been no destruction of Japanese 
capital. Note how quickly the standard model's log(}J) 
rises at first. This reflects the high initial values of 
shown in Chart 2.
7 
6Value-weighted nominal return data are from Japan 1988. Nominal 
returns are adjusted using the price deflator for personal consumption expendi-
tures from the last quarter of the previous year to the last quarter of the current 
year, from Japan 1989a,b. 
7 Output data are from Japan, various years. 
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Charts 1-4 
The Reconstruction Hypothesis vs. The Japanese Data 
Predictions of Two Neoclassical Growth Models vs. Data for Various Japanese Economic Indicators 
Chart 1 The Saving Rate 
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15 ... Significantly 
Several studies provide examples in which apparently 
large perturbations in decision rules actually have a 
small welfare impact in growth models like the stan-
dard one considered here (Mirrlees and Stern 1972, 
Cochrane 1988, Smith 1989). In general, these exam-
ples suggest the disconcerting possibility that tiny un-
modeled costs—like computational costs and adjust-
ment costs—that are associated with the optimal rule 
but not the perturbed rule could drastically affect model 
solutions. In the present context, if there were a small 
welfare difference between the optimal rule in the 
standard model and the actual historical decisions, then 
we would suspect the existence of very small, plausible 
changes in assumptions in the standard model that 
could reconcile it with the empirical evidence. Then we 
would be inclined to conclude that the differences 
between the standard model's predictions and the data 
are not economically significant. In fact, I find that the 
differences are extremely large economically. 
A problem that has to be confronted in computing 
the welfare difference between the standard model's 
optimal rule and the data is that reliable data on 
Japanese consumption covering the first decade of the 
postwar period are not available. These are required for 
the welfare calculations. Therefore, instead of compar-
ing the standard model's solution directly with the data, 
I compare it with the solution implied by a modified 
version of that model. The details of this model, which I 
call the slow convergence model, are described below. 
This model generates saving data that are essentially a 
smoothed version of the actual data (as is clear in Chart 
1). For this reason, it seems reasonable to use this 
model's response to wartime destruction of physical 
capital as a proxy for the actual Japanese data. 
The value to the standard model's representative 
agent of following the slow convergence plan given 
kx 946 = 0.12k = 0.5 87 is -0.961 ? This plan is, of course, 
suboptimal in the context of the standard model. 
The value of behaving optimally in that model, given 
^1946 — 0.054, is —0.963
9 Thus, behaving optimally 
given an initial capital stock of 0.054 generates roughly 
the same amount of utility to the standard model's agent 
as does following the slow convergence policy and 
starting with capital of 0.587. This means that the 
standard model's representative agent who starts with 
946
 = 0.5 8 7 and is constrained to follow the sub-
optimal policy would be willing to pay up to 90 percent 
of the capital stock in exchange for the privilege of 
following the optimal policy.
1
0
 This 90 percent figure 
seems quite large, which suggests that the difference 
between the monotonically declining saving rate opti-
mal in the standard model and the hump-shaped saving 
rate observed in the data is economically very large. 
Modified, It Succeeds ... 
The results examined in the charts so far indicate that 
the standard model cannot account for the main 
features of the postwar Japanese saving experience. 
Another look at Chart 1 suggests an obvious problem 
with that model. It predicts that Japan invests almost 
half of its NNP immediately after the war. There are at 
least two reasons why this might not have been desir-
able. One is that shifting that many resources into 
investment might have generated unacceptable adjust-
ment costs. Another is that the marginal value of 
current consumption might simply have been too high 
due to the population being very near subsistence.
1
1 
Either of these factors, which are not in the standard 
model, might have prevented the high level of invest-
ment anticipated by that model. 
To get a feel for the potential of these considerations 
to account for the Japanese experience, I replace the 
representative agent's preferences by these: 
(16) sr=i946[l/(l +p)F1946 log(Q - C*ZtNt) 
for c* = 0.76. With these preferences, as Ct declines to 
its subsistence level, c*ztNt, the marginal utility of con-
sumption shoots off to infinity, which discourages 
investment. A technical virtue of this parameterization 
is that its steady-state characteristics coincide with 
8This was computed by substituting C/ for t = 1, 2, 3,..., 900 into (5), 
where Ct
s is the optimal level of consumption implied by the slow convergence 
model. 
9These numbers are an automatic by-product of the method I use to solve 
the model, which is described in detail in the Appendix. The value of fc1946 (that 
is, 0.054) associated with a welfare level of—0.963 is fairly precisely estimated 
since nearby values of&1946 generate very different welfare levels. In particular, 
given the values of fc1946 of 0.051, 0.054, and 0.056, the associated welfare 
levels are —1.013, —0.963, and —0.915, respectively. 
10The welfare difference discussed here is a stock concept. There is also a 
flow concept. One such concept measures by what constant fraction consump-
tion in the optimal plan has to be decreased for the resulting consumption 
sequence to generate the same utility as the suboptimal plan. The optimal plan 
in the standard model is worth 2.49, starting with &1946 = 0.587. The facts that 
the suboptimal plan is worth —0.963 in the standard model and that p = 0.03 
imply that this constant fraction is 10 percent. This means that the representa-
tive agent would be willing to pay up to 10 percent of consumption in the 
optimal plan indefinitely in exchange for being permitted to switch from the 
suboptimal to the optimal plan. 
nFor example, according to Jones (1985, p. 3), "Saving rates were low 
after the war, as real income was reduced to a near subsistence level." Jones 
apparently does not have a biological notion of subsistence in mind, since 
Japanese per capita income was higher in 1946 than it was in the first two 
decades of this century. (See Romer 1986, Fig. 1.) 
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those of the standard model. This facilitates a compari-
son of the implications of this model with those already 
discussed for the standard model. For reasons that will 
be clear shortly, I call this model the slow convergence 
model 
I simulated this model's response to the same initial 
Kt value used in the simulation of the standard model. 
The resulting values of st, % Kt/Yt, log(IJ), and Rt are 
also reported in Charts 1-5. 
Return once more to Chart 1. As noted previously, 
the saving rate implied by the slow convergence model 
matches the empirical saving data very closely. Indeed, 
the artificial saving data look like the trend line one 
might draw through the Japanese data. The results in 
Chart 2 show that the slow convergence model ac-
counts for the hump-shaped pattern in % Significantly, 
the peak in ^occurs in the early 1960s and before the 
peak in st, which occurs at the end of the 1960s. In this 
respect, the simulated slow convergence data match the 
empirical data quite well. Turning to Chart 3, we see 
that this model also accounts better for the behavior of 
the capital-to-output ratio in the 1970s. 
Chart 4 shows the return on capital, the Rt\s, implied 
by the slow convergence model. Notice how much 
higher these are than those implied by the standard 
model. The reason for this is obvious from equation 
(14), which shows that Rt is a decreasing function of 
kt+x, and from the fact that, for t= 1946,1947,..., kt+l 
is less in the slow convergence model than in the 
standard model. Of course, as t —•* both sequences of 
Rt's converge, to 6.04 percent. The higher R/s implied 
by the slow convergence model make it seem slightly 
more consistent with the data than those of the standard 
model. However, as noted before, drawing definite 
conclusions is difficult because of the volatility in 
Japanese stock returns. 
Chart 5 plots \og(Yt) from the slow convergence 
model along with that from the standard model. Note 
that log(r1946) for the two models coincide, reflecting 
their shared initial condition, K\946. Immediately there-
after, though, they diverge, as the standard model 
converges rapidly to the steady-state output path, while 
the model with c* = 0.76 (true to its name) converges 
very slowly. In fact, this model takes 72 years to close 
95 percent of the 1946 discrepancy between actual and 
steady-state capital. This contrasts with the 26-year 
adjustment lag noted previously for the standard model. 
Again, because their steady states are the same, the 
standard and slow convergence models' log(^) even-
tually converge. 
One way to see the impact of going from c* = 0 in the 
standard model to c* = 0.76 in the slow convergence 
model is to compare c1946 across the two models. 
[Recall that ct= Ct/(ztNt).] That c1946 is quite low in the 
standard model is implied by that model's high saving 
rate, reported in Chart 1. Its value is c1946 = 0.425, or 
one-third of its value in the steady state. The representa-
tive agent in the slow convergence economy avoids 
such a low value for c1946 because c* > 0.425 implies 
that such a choice is literally infinitely painful. Instead, 
that agent sets c1946 = 0.7 62, which is just a little higher 
than c* and, of course, much higher than the value of 
c1946 in the standard model. 
... Tentatively 
The slow convergence model appears capable of 
capturing the essential features of the Japanese postwar 
saving experience. This seems encouraging for the 
reconstruction hypothesis, since the model does so 
simply by extrapolating the effects of wartime destruc-
tion of capital. However, we must remember that the 
ability of the model to do this reflects a change 
introduced specifically for the purpose of fitting the 
Japanese data. Building confidence in this explanation 
of the data requires developing independent evidence in 
its favor. Several possibilities along this line include 
comparing the postwar experience of other countries, 
like Germany, with the predictions of the model. 
Alternatively, we could see what c* # 0 does for the 
business cycle implications of the model. 
Confidence in the slow convergence model's ex-
planation also requires a satisfactory interpretation of 
c* 0. One possibility is that it reflects an increase over 
time in basic social expectations about the minimum 
acceptable quality of life. Taken literally, the model 
posits that the increase over time in this minimum living 
standard is occurring in a way unrelated to the con-
sumption and investment decisions. Another way to 
capture this idea, that avoids the exogeneity assump-
tion, would be to assume that what is deemed a 
minimum acceptable quality of life is a function of how 
much consumption has occurred in the recent past 
(Constantinedes 1988,Nason 1988). 
Still another possibility is that the good performance 
of the slow convergence model reflects not that the 
marginal value of consumption was very high in early 
postwar Japan, but that high investment was inhibited 
by adjustment costs associated with rapidly increasing 
investment. Possibly, one way to discriminate between 
the adjustment cost account for the low level of 
investment in postwar Japan and the subsistence level 
account pursued here is to use their rate of return 
17 implications. The subsistence level approach apparent-
ly implies a very high rate of return of investment 
immediately after the war (as in Chart 4), while the 
adjustment cost story probably implies a lower return 
on investment measured inclusive of adjustment costs. 
Pursuing these issues further requires finding more 
reliable evidence on the postwar rate of return on 
investment than I have and simulating appropriately 
modified versions of the neoclassical growth model. 
Concluding Remarks 
Summary 
For the past 20 years, Japan's saving rate has on 
average been high compared to that of the United 
States. One explanation for this was advanced by 
Hayashi (1986) and is called here the reconstruction 
hypothesis. According to this hypothesis, which is based 
on analysis of the neoclassical growth model, Japan's 
high saving rate of the late 1960s and early 1970s is 
that country's response to the partial destruction of its 
capital stock in World War II. The idea, essentially, is 
that investment had to be high to restore the capital 
stock to where it would have been in the absence of the 
war. This high level of investment translates into a high 
expected saving rate under the assumption that the 
inflow of foreign capital into Japan was restricted, 
either by capital controls or by foreigners' uncertainty. 
In this paper, I have tried to evaluate, quantitatively, 
the plausibility of the reconstruction hypothesis. By 
using a closed economy model, I adopted an extreme 
version of the assumption that capital inflows to Japan 
were restricted. Variants of my model have been used 
successfully to investigate a wide range of quantitative 
issues regarding the postwar United States. For this 
reason, I have called it the standard model Using this 
model to study the likely impact of Japan's reduced 
capital stock is consistent with the assumption implicit 
in Hayashi's argument that, for purposes of understand-
ing the broad outlines of the postwar Japanese saving 
behavior, we can abstract from all differences between 
the U.S. and Japanese economies except the different 
levels of physical capital. 
When I simulated the impact of large-scale destruc-
tion of the capital stock on the standard model, I found 
that the response of the model differed substantially 
from the postwar Japanese experience in two respects. 
First, the effects of wartime destruction of the capital 
stock were completely dissipated in 26 years. This is far 
shorter than the nearly 40-year adjustment period that 
the reconstruction hypothesis presumes. Second, the 
standard model implies that the Japanese saving rate 
should have peaked immediately after the war—at 
nearly 50 percent of NNP—and then declined mono-
tonically thereafter. What actually happened was that 
the Japanese saving rate displayed a hump-shaped 
pattern: initially it was very low, and it did not reach a 
peak until about 24 years after the war, whereupon it 
fell again. From the perspective of this model, the 
reconstruction hypothesis seems implausible. 
There are several reasons to be suspicious about the 
standard model's prediction that the saving rate should 
have peaked at nearly 50 percent of NNP immediately 
after the war. That model abstracts from at least two 
considerations that might have prevented high saving in 
the immediate postwar period. One of these—suggest-
ed by reports that the Japanese were reduced to 
subsistence at the end of the war—is that the value of 
current consumption was so very high at the time that 
the Japanese chose not to save after the war. Another 
possibility is simply that the economy could not quickly 
shift half its resources into fixed capital investment 
without suffering unacceptable costs. If either of these 
two factors depressed investment long enough, then we 
could account for the long adjustment period and the 
hump-shaped saving rate experienced by Japan. This is 
suggested by a modified version of the standard model, 
according to which the Japanese chose not to save 
much in the immediate postwar period because the 
marginal value of consumption was very high. 
What I conclude from these results is the following. 
The fact that a standard model used to study a large 
variety of quantitative issues cannot account for the 
postwar Japanese saving experience is a setback for the 
reconstruction hypothesis. The fact that my modified 
model can account for the Japanese experience is not a 
vindication of the hypothesis; but it does suggest that 
the hypothesis is not completely implausible. 
Suggested Research 
To build confidence in the reconstruction hypothesis, 
more work needs to be done—both in quantitative 
theory and in data measurement. 
• Quantitative Theory 
With regard to theory, this paper suggests a variety of 
alternative model specifications that have the potential 
to account for the hump-shaped feature of the Japanese 
saving rate and the length of the adjustment period. 
These models could be solved and simulated in the 
same way that I have done for the models in this paper, 
to see what their implications are for the Japanese 
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saving rate and also for other variables, such as the 
return on investment and output growth. 
Besides the quantitative theoretical exercises pro-
posed above, it would be wise to simulate versions of 
the models in which hours worked can vary. Such a 
model—by implying that work effort in the immediate 
postwar period is unusually intense—would likely have 
a harder time accounting for the length of the adjust-
ment lag. In addition, it would be of interest to study the 
impact of introducing international trade considera-
tions into the neoclassical growth model. Presumably, 
permitting international capital flows would also in-
crease the difficulty of accounting for the length of the 
adjustment lag using the reconstruction hypothesis. 
Finally, it would be worthwhile to investigate the 
importance of the basic assumption of the neoclassical 
growth model, which is that the rate of progress of 
technological knowledge (zt/zt-{) is exogenous. More 
plausible is the assumption that this rate is endogenous 
and is affected by such things as investments in research 
and education. One expects that if something causes a 
jump in the return to investment in physical capital—as 
I have assumed happened in Japan—then resources will 
be transferred from sectors devoted to enhancing 
technical progress to sectors producing physical capital. 
The effect of this would be to reduce the pace of 
technical progress for a while, with the consequence 
that the economy's steady-state growth path is reduced. 
(This happens, essentially, because the parameter x is 
reduced for a while.) Thus, within a version of the 
neoclassical model, modified to make the pace of tech-
nical progress endogenous, the reconstruction hypothe-
sis is that U.S. output per capita remains permanently 
above Japanese output per capita, so that convergence 
never occurs. If these considerations are quantitatively 
important, then the fact that convergence between 
Japan and the United States seems to have occurred is 
an embarrassment for the reconstruction hypothesis. 
With good quality data, quantitative exercises such 
as these would suggest which, if any, version of the 
reconstruction hypothesis provides a plausible account 
for the Japanese postwar experience. 
• Data Measurement 
More good quality data are needed, too. Most impor-
tant, we need to confirm Hayashi's suspicion (in this 
issue) that the high and falling Japanese capital-to-
output ratio in the 1950s reflects measurement error. If 
it turns out to be wrong, then the reconstruction hypoth-
esis has been dealt a major blow. 
In addition, I have analyzed the reconstruction hy-
pothesis without any hard economic data for the first 10 
years after the war. The only information I have is 
anecdotal evidence which suggests that saving was very 
low in this period. Besides data on the saving rate and 
other variables, reliable data on the rate of return on 
investment would be particularly informative. Rate of 
return movements are a key feature of the reconstruc-
tion hypothesis, since high rates of return are what 
motivates the reconstruction phase. Also, I have argued 
that rate of return data can be used to discriminate 
between alternative versions of the neoclassical growth 
model that are being used to rationalize the reconstruc-
tion hypothesis. 
Research on other empirical issues would be useful 
as well. For example, my calculations have assumed 
that Japan started the postwar period 88 percent below 
its steady-state growth path for physical capital. More 
careful measurement of this is needed, since my esti-
mate is based on sketchy data and is likely to be an 
overstatement. If so, then reconciling the reconstruction 
hypothesis with the nearly 40-year adjustment lag may 
be harder. 
19 Appendix 
Solving a Neoclassical Growth Model 
In the preceding paper, before I computed any model's 
responses to destruction of part of the capital stock, I had to 
first find the model's solution. By a solution, I mean a function 
relating current decisions about consumption and other vari-
ables to variables that are currently fixed, such as the stock of 
physical capital, which maximize the utility function subject 
to the constraints. In this Appendix, I describe the method I 
used to find the solution to the two versions of the neoclassical 
growth model in the paper and how I used the solution to get 
the results reported there. 
The solution to the model studied in the paper is not 
known, so that some sort of approximation is required. (For a 
summary of several existing methods, see Taylor and Uhlig 
1989.) The easiest such approximation method is the linear 
quadratic (LQ) procedure proposed by Kydland and Prescott 
(1982). That method has been successfully applied in a 
business cycle context where the range of variation in the data 
is small enough that the method is very accurate. (On this, see 
Christiano 1989a.) However, in the application of this paper, 
the LQ solution may not be so accurate because the paper is 
concerned with the dynamic properties of a growth model 
under an extremely wide range of capital stock values. Solv-
ing the model by a grid approximation method is, therefore, 
safer. Although this method is computationally costly, it can 
be tuned to generate as much accuracy as desired. 
One thing most solution procedures have in common is the 
requirement that the variables in the model remain within 
some bounded set. That is obviously not a property of the 
model in this paper, since all the variables grow indefinitely. 
However, the variables are rendered stationary after division 
by ztNt. This is the basis of the transformation described below 
which converts the model into an alternative, equivalent 
model with variables that do remain in a bounded set. After 
that I give a precise mathematical statement of the objects 
computed using the model, followed by a description of the 
grid approximation method used to get them. Finally, I discuss 
how I went about tuning the grid approximation method to get 
an acceptable level of accuracy. 
The Detrended Growth Model 
According to the model, a representative agent chooses con-
sumption, C„ for t = 0, 1, 2, ... to maximize the paper's 
equation (5) or (16) subject to equations (1M4).
1 Define the 
detrended consumption and capital variables, ct and kt, as 
(Al) ct = CJ (ztNt) 
(A2) kt = KJ (ztNt). 
Expressed in terms of these variables, the agent's problem is to 
choose [c„ kt+l; t—0, 1, 2,...} to maximize 
(A3) K + o P log(c, - c.) 
for p = 1/(1 +p) subject to 
(A4) ct + exp{x+n)kt+x - (1 ~8)kt = ket. 
For obvious reasons, I call this the detrended optimization 
problem. When c* = 0, this is the standard model, while 
c» = 0.76 defines the slow convergence model. In (A3), K = 
Xt=o ft \og(ztNt). Since this is simply an exogenous constant, it 
has no impact on the optimum and so is ignored from now on. 
Substantively, whether the agent solves the original or the 
detrended optimization problem does not matter. This is 
because the choice variables in the former, C, and K(+l, and 
those in the latter, ct and kt+h are related by a simple trans-
formation. I introduce the detrended version of the problem 
only because the standard tools of mathematical optimization 
theory apply to it: In the original problem, Ct and Kt+l grow 
indefinitely; but in the detrended problem, ct and kt+x settle 
down to constant values as t — 
The Properties of the Model 
Here I give a mathematical statement of the properties of the 
model that were of interest in the paper. 
First, although I have posed the agent's problem as though 
it involves two choice variables, ct and kt+l, the resource 
constraint implies there is really only one choice. The problem 
is reduced to choosing kt+l by eliminating ct in (A3) using the 
constraint, (A4). Once that is done, the problem becomes to 
maximize, with respect to {kt+l; t = 0,1,2,...}, 2,=0 P log[fc, 
-I- (1—d)kt — exp(jc+ri)kt+l — cJ. This problem can be 
formulated as a dynamic programming problem: 
(A5) v(k) = mdixk'tA(k) {u(k,k') + /3v(k')} 
where A(k) is the set of nonnegative k' for which the implied 
level of consumption, c, is nonnegative. Formally: 
lrTo simplify the notation in the Appendix, I let t=0 correspond to the year 
1946, t = 1 to 1947, and so on. 
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(A6) A(k) = {kf :0<kf< exp(-jt-n) [kd + (1 -8)k]}. 
Here, I follow the dynamic programming convention of 
dropping the t subscript. The variable k denotes the detrended 
physical stock of capital available at the beginning of the 
current period, and k' denotes the corresponding quantity 
available at the beginning of the next period. (Do not confuse 
the definition of k used here with the different one that appears 
in the paper.) In (A5), 
(A7) u(k,k') = log[kd + (1-5)* - exp(jt+n)k' - cj. 
The problem is solved by first finding a value function, v, that 
satisfies (A5). Given v, the solution to the maximization prob-
lem to the right of the equality in (A5) is a function (a decision 
rule) relating k! to k\ call it f(k). Given an initial value of 
k—say, A:0—this rule lets me compute a sequence kt =f(kt-{) 
for t = 1,2,3, Given values for N0 and z0,1 can then get a 
sequence Kt for t = 1, 2, 3,... using the kt*s, (Al), and (A2). 
(I set N0 = z0= 1.) Given these K,'s, a sequence C, for t = 0,1, 
2,... can be computed using (1). In addition, gross output, Yt, 
can be obtained from (2) for t = 0,1,2, A sequence for the 
net saving rate, st for t — 0,1,2,..., can be obtained from (12), 
and the /?/s can be computed using (14). The time paths of 
these variables are the model properties that are discussed in 
the paper. 
The Grid Approximation Procedure 
The hard part in the calculations just described is the first step, 
finding the v function. Apart from a single special case, in 
which 8 = 1 and c* = 0, there is no known way of finding it, 
although v is known to exist. Still, though we don't know how 
to compute v exactly, we do have various ways to approxi-
mate it. Each involves replacing the actual problem, (A5), 
with another problem which has a tractable solution that we 
hope is close to the solution of the actual problem. 
The approximation procedure that seems most appro-
priate here is the following. I assume that k can only take on a 
finite set of M values belonging to the grid k = {£,, k2, • • •,kM}. 
Her e for/= 1,...,M— 1. Thus, at any given time, the 
agent inherits some kek from the past and k! must be chosen 
from the intersection of A(k) and k. Formally, this is the 
problem: 
(A8) V(k) = matron* {w(U') + j8 V(k')} 
for kek. Let the decision rule that solves (A8) be denoted 
k' = F(k). The dependence of V and Fon the details of the grid, 
k, is suppressed to conserve notation. Solving (A8), in the 
sense of finding Vand F, is computationally tractable. More-
over, Fand/should be virtually identical when Mis large and 
the grid, k, is fine. 
I used the following iterative procedure to solve (A8). I set 
V°(k) = u(k,kx) for kek and then computed V
1, V
2,..., VJ as 
follows: 
(A9) VJ+Kk) = maxk,tMk)n~k {u(k,k') + fiVKk')} 
fory = 0,1,2,..., J— 1 and for all kek. For each j, I computed 
(A10) rjj = max** |[VK& ~ V
j~\k)]IVKk)\ 100 
where |-| denotes the absolute value. The integer J is defined 
as the first value of j for which rjj < 0.1~
6.1 set V = VJ. The 
maximization in (A9) was done by evaluating the expression 
in braces at k! = k and at successively higher points in the k 
grid. The maximizing value of k! was assumed to be the point 
in k just before the first grid point where the value of the 
expression in braces falls. This method assumes that the 
expression in braces is concave in k\ a property known to be 
satisfied by the expression in braces in (A5).
2 
Now I need only describe exactly how I chose the grid, k. 
I know that my problem has exactly two steady-state values 
of k. [A steady-state value of k is defined by the property 
k =/(&).] Let k* and k* denote the smaller and larger of these, 
respectively. I set k{ = k* + 0.005 and kM = k*. Here, k* is the 
lowest nonnegative capital stock that lets c = c* be sustained 
indefinitely; that is, c* = + [ 1 — 8 — exp(x+n)]k*. Obvi-
ously, K — 0 when c* = 0. This bad steady state is unstable. 
The stable steady-state capital stock is k*. From (8): 
(All) k* = {fid/[exp(x+n) - /3(l-<5)]}
1/(1-
0). 
The fact that k* (and, hence, c) is independent of c* reflects the 
constancy of the marginal utility of consumption in a steady 
state. As a result, the marginal utility of consumption does not 
appear in the steady-state intertemporal substitution in con-
sumption. The reason for not considering values of k greater 
than k* is that I am only interested in the economy's response 
to a low initial value of k. 
I experimented with two ways of selecting the intervals 
between kt and ki+l for i = 1,. . . , M — 1 and with several 
settings for M. In one type of grid, the fixed interval grid, I let 
ki+l — kt be a constant for i = 1,..., M — 1. In the other type of 
grid, the proportional interval grid, I let log(£I+1 ) — log(£,) be a 
constant for i = I,... f M — 1. In this second grid type, the 
interval between kt and ki+l is roughly proportional to kt. 
The Choice of a Capital Grid 
Now I describe the computational experiments used to decide 
on a grid type and a value for M. 
Obviously, the appropriate grid type and value of M are 
those that produce an F function as similar as possible to the 
object of interest,/. This would be simple if/were available. 
Since it is not, I must instead base my choice of grid on indirect 
evidence about the similarity between/and F. I used two such 
pieces of evidence. Each focuses on the basic objective that 
motivates the calculations: to compute Rt, Yt, ?t, st, Kt/Yt for 
t = 0, 1,2,..., 69 starting from k0 = 0A2k* and N0 = z0 = 1. 
2More sophisticated versions of the grid approximation method are de-
scribed in Bertsekas 1976. See also Christiano 1989a and Christiano and 
Fitzgerald 1989. 
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Evaluating the Accuracy of Grid Approximations 
Table A1 The Standard Model (c. = 0) 
Capital 
Grid Size 
M Statistic Value ot Value of \xM/xM''m
 | When x- § CPU 
Type (No. of Over \R,/MRSrM Time 











Maximum  .0050  —  —  —  —  — 
Mean  .0011 
(t at Max.)  (9) 
Maximum  .00320  .0181  .00072  .0063  .00130  .000190 
Mean  .00056  .0067  .00022  .0028  .00039  .000053 
(t at Max.)  (0)  (46)  (47)  (47)  (47)  (4) 
Maximum  .0271  —  — 
Mean  .0037 
(/ at Max.)  (31) 
Maximum  .0136  .1207  .0049  .0434  .0088  .00110 
Mean  .0020  .0253  .0013  .0101  .0023  .00031 





tHere, R, = the marginal product of capital and MRS, = the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution in consumption. The interior 
first-order condition for the continuous capital problem implies that R, = MRS,. The maximum values in this column are computed 
with equation (A13); the means, with (A14). 
§These are the absolute percentage changes in the selected variables for successive refinements in the capital grid. For example, 
the column marked s, provides information on how {SQ Sgg} changes as M changes from 1,000 to 2,000. The maximum 
values in these columns are computed with equation (A15); the means, with (A16). 
One characteristic satisfied by the solution to the exact 
problem of interest is that the marginal rate of substitution in 
consumption, MRSt, is equated to the marginal product of 
capital, Rt. [For convenience, I define Rt = Oke,+\ +1—6 here, 
in contrast with definition (14) in the paper.] Here, 
(A 12) MRS, = [exp(jc+/i)/0][(c,+1 - c.)/(c, - c,)]. 
This suggests that one useful strategy for evaluating the 
accuracy of the grid approximation method is to determine 
whether | RJMRSt — 11 for t = O, 1,..., 69 are close to zero. 
I measured proximity to zero by these two statistics: 
(A 13) max,e{0 .., 69j \RtlMRSt — 11 
(A 14) (1/69)2^1 Rt/MRSt-l\. 
The other piece of evidence I considered is the amount by 
which the variables of interest change as M is increased. For 
example, let sf for t = 0,..., 69 denote the sequence of net 




the corresponding variables computed on a grid with 1,000 
fewer points. Here are two measures of the proximity of stM 
and stM~l: 
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Table A2 The Slow Convergence Model (c* = 0.76) 
Capital 
Grid Size 
M Statistic Value ot Value of \xM/xM~)m
 | When x = § CPU 
Type (No. of Over |/?,/M?Sr1| Time 
of Grid Points) /=0,...,69 (andOt s, Yt ?t K,/Y, R, (Minutes) 
Fixed 1,000 Maximum 2.1887 
Interval Mean .0655 
Grid (/at Max.) (1) 
2,000 Maximum .6107 
Mean .0221 
(/at Max.) (0) 
Proportional 1,000 Maximum .4462 
Interval Mean .0191 
Grid (/at Max.) (1) 
2,000 Maximum .2044 
Mean .0114 
(/ at Max.) (0) 
3,000 Maximum .1451 
Mean .0097 
(/at Max.) (1) 
4,000 Maximum .0498 
Mean .0043 
(/ at Max.) (0) 
5,000 Maximum .0389 
Mean .0041 
(/ at Max.) (0) 

























































































00° — 11. 
The idea is that if (A 15) and (A 16) are small, then there is 
some basis for confidence that st
M approximates reasonably 
well the corresponding variable in the continuous grid prob-
lem. I computed the analog of (A15)-(A16) for all the 
variables of interest: st, Yt, ?t, Kt/Yt1 and Rt. 
The statistics from (A 13)-(A 16) are reported in Tables A1 
and A2 for the growth models with c* = 0 and 0.76, respec-
tively. These data were all calculated on the Minneapolis 
Fed's Amdahl 5860 mainframe computer.
3 
Let's first consider Table Al, which is based on the stan-
dard model. The results suggest that the fixed interval grid 
method is highly accurate, even for M = 1,000. In particular, 
Rt and MRSt differ by 0.5 percent at most and only by 0.1 
percent on average. As expected, Rt and MRSt are even closer 
when M is increased to 2,000. Sample paths for Yt, ?t, KJYV 
3 Dave Runkle tells me that in one informal experiment a Fortran program 
ran 100 times faster on the Amdahl than on an 83 86-based computer with a 20 
megahertz clock. 
23 and Rt seem to have converged at M = 1,000, since the 
changes in these when M = 2,000 is very tiny. For example, 
the average change in fjis only about 0.3 percent. The change 
in st is somewhat greater—1.8 percent at most and 0.67 
percent on average. 
Table A1 also displays data for the proportional interval 
grid for comparison. The results primarily suggest that the 
proportional grid is slightly less accurate than the fixed grid. 
For example, Rt differs from MRS, an average of 0.2 percent 
when M = 2,000 and the grid is proportional, while the 
difference averages roughly 0.06 percent for that M when the 
grid is fixed. Therefore, the calculations in the paper for the 
model with c* = 0 are based on M = 2,000 and the fixed 
interval grid. Moreover, the evidence in this table gives us 
considerable confidence in the accuracy of the solution. 
Now consider Table A2, which reports results based on the 
slow convergence model, with c* = 0.76. Note that here, with 
a fixed interval grid, when M = 1,000, R, is quite different 
from MRS„ indicating a potentially serious problem with the 
grid solution for this model. In particular, Rt differs from MRSt 
by as much as 219 percent for t— 1 and by roughly 7 percent 
on average. The situation improves for M= 2,000, though not 
by much compared to the results in Table A1. For example, R, 
still differs from MRSt by as much as 61 percent for t = 1 and 
by about 2 percent on average. 
The situation is depicted in the accompanying chart, which 
displays the R, s and the MRS, s for the fixed interval grid with 
M= 1,000. Evidently, the MRS/s behave erratically for small 
values of t, while the /?/s are quite smooth. Also, inspection of 
Table A2 suggests that the Rt*s have converged. As M goes 
from 1,000 to 2,000, they change by at most only 0.18 percent 
Marginal Rate of Substitution 
and Marginal Product of Capital 
[c* = 076 Model, Fixed Interval Grid, M= 1,000) 
and on average 0.04 percent. The convergence of Rt is even 
tighter with the proportional grid. Thus, it appears that the 
poor performance of the grid solution relative to (A 13)-
(A14) reflects the slow convergence of MRSt with respect to 
M. 
Problems with MRS, are concentrated in low values of t. 
This reflects that when t is small, c, is close to c*, so that the 
MRSt is very sensitive to inaccuracies in higher-order digits of 
ct. Because the proportional interval grid distributes more 
points in the area of small values of kt, it is not surprising that 
the (A 13)-(A 14) statistics perform somewhat better when the 
grid is proportional. For example, recall that when M= 1,000 
the largest difference between Rt and MRSt is 219 percent 
when the fixed interval grid is used. With the proportional 
interval grid, that number falls to 45 percent. The other 
statistics generally also perform better with the proportional 
grid. As in Table Al, here in Table A2 st is a bit slow to 
converge in M, though its convergence is certainly acceptable 
for M = 5,000. I took the proportional interval grid with 
M— 5,000 as the most accurate one for the c* = 0.76 model. 
This exercise suggests two lessons to me. First, focusing 
exclusively on the first-order condition test, equations (A 13)-
(A14), can be misleading. The first-order condition results in 
Table A2 suggest that the fixed interval grid approximation is 
terrible. The convergence test on the variables of interest, 
however, suggests a considerably less bleak picture. Second, 
the analysis suggests that no one grid type will be optimal 
across applications. The fixed interval grid seems best for the 
standard (c* = 0) model and the proportional grid seems best 
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